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µ,1*22'&216&,(1&(¶CONSCIENCE-BASED EXEMPTIONS AND PROPER 
MEDICAL TREATMENT* 
 
Sara Fovargue and Mary Neal 
 
Lack of clarity about the proper limits of conscientious refusal to participate in particular 
healthcare practices has given rise to fears that, in the absence of clear parameters, 
conscience-based exemptions may become increasingly widespread, leading to intolerable 
burdens on health professionals, patients, and institutions. Here, we identify three factors 
which clarify the proper scope of conscience-based exemptions: the liminal zone of ³proper 
medical treatment´ as their territorial extent; some criteria for genuine conscientiousness; 
and the fact that the exercise of a valid conscience-based exemption carries certain duties 
with it. These restricting factors should reassure those who worry that recognising rights of 
conscience at all inevitably risks rampant subjectivity and self-interest on the part of 
professionals. At the same time, they delineate a robust conscience zone: where a claim of 
conscience relates to treatment with liminal status and satisfies the criteria for conscientious 
character, as well as the conditions for conscientious performance, it deserves muscular 
legal protection. 
 
Keywords: Conscience, Conscientious objection, Conscience-based exemptions, Proper 
medical treatment, Professional obligations, Professional ethics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Concerns have been raised that the phenomenon of conscientious objection is developing in 
WKHKHDOWKFDUHFRQWH[W LQD µZLOG¶1 or haphazard manner, with no clear criteria by which to 
assess the validity of conscience-based claims, and no general agreement regarding the 
conditions that ought to delineate the proper exercise of conscience where a valid claim 
H[LVWV &DQWRU XVHV WKH WHUP µFRQVFLHQFH FUHHS¶ in relation to US regulations and rules to 
describe what she regards as an unchecked expansion.2 The fear seems to be that, if we allow 
SULYDWHYDOXHVWRµLQWUXGH¶3 improperly into the public realm of healthcare, we necessarily risk 
healthcare professionalV +&3V HLWKHU µGLVDYRZLQJ¶4 certain professional obligations 
altogether, thus abandoning their responsibilities and their patients, or µimposing their moral 
SUHIHUHQFHV¶5 on patients instead of respecting patient autonomy. For a patient, the outcome 
of an encounter with a HCP who allows her private values to influence her practice unduly 
might range from (at best) mild inconvenience, powerlessness, and/or a sense of being 
judged, to (at worst) a feeling of being abused, and/or experiencing serious obstacles to 
accessing proper medical treatment. Here, we seek to assuage these concerns. We examine 
the contention that conscientious objection is µcreeping¶ unchecked within guidance on 
healthcare practice in England and Wales, and then suggest three natural limits to the exercise 
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of conscience-based exemptions which ought to reassure those who worry about increased 
potential for conscience creep, at least within professional guidance.    
 Three points require clarification. FirstZHDGRSWWKHµSUHYailing view of conscience 
LQ ELRHWKLFV¶6 DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK µDSSHDOV WR FRQVFLHQFH FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV HIIRUWV WR
preserve or maintain moral LQWHJULW\¶7 On this view, the faculty of conscience is fundamental 
to moral agency and a proper feature of all areas of human endeavour, including professional 
practice. Space prevents us from explaining our view of conscience in detail; we aim to do 
this elsewhere.8 Here, our focus is on how conscience should be protected. Second, and partly 
as a result of our commitment to a broadly positive view of conscience, we use variants of the 
WHUPµconscience-based H[HPSWLRQ¶&%(LQSUHIHUHQFHWRµFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQ/objector¶
(CO). When referring specifically to an exemption from acting, CBE is a more accurate and 
neutral term than the more familiar µCO¶. Labelling a HCP simply as an µobjector¶ ignores all 
KHURWKHUFRQWULEXWLRQVDQGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGREVFXUHVWKHIDFW WKDWD+&3¶VUHOXFWDQFHRU
refusal to participate in certain types of treatment will almost always be based on a positive 
commitment; for example, to an alternative view of the goals of healthcare. In some instances 
ZKHUH µ&%(¶ ZRXOG EH JUDPPDWLFDOO\-incorrect, µREMHFWLRQ¶µREMHFWRU¶ ZLOO EH XVHG GHVSLWH
the misgivings noted here. Finally, we engage here with concern about the potential for the 
expansion of conscientious refusals into increasing areas of healthcare, due to vague, 
contradictory, or overly confident professional guidelines. Empirical questions about the 
actual incidence of refusals, and whether they are increasing, are not posed. Thus, when we 
UHIHUWRµFUHHS¶we are referring to the potential for CBEs to come to feature more widely in 
medical practice, rather than to any upswing in the total number of conscience claims. 
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II. PROTECTION FOR CONSCIENCE IN ENGLAND, WALES AND SCOTLAND 
 
Two statutory CBEs exist in the UK, in section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 and section 38 of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Section 4(1) of the 1967 Act provides 
that no-one is under any duty to participate, contrary to her conscience, in any treatment 
authorised by the Act, although the exemption does not apply where WUHDWPHQWµLVQHFHVVDU\
to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a 
pregnant womDQ¶VHFWLRQ). Likewise, section 38 of the 1990 Act provides an exemption 
from having to participate in any activity governed by that Act. Secondary legislation places 
an important limit on the protection afforded by section 4, as those who contract with the 
NHS and exercise their CBE under that section, µ[must make] prompt referral to another 
provider of primary medical services who does not have VXFK FRQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQV¶9 
Thus, GPs who wish to be exempt under section 4 must refer patients promptly to another 
doctor. We discuss referral in section IIIC3 below. 
 Rights of conscience are also protected under Article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights µIUHHGRPRIWKRXJKWFRQVFLHQFHDQGUHOLJLRQ¶, and have been mentioned 
in cases which have recently been brought under Article 8 in relation to abortion.10 In the UK, 
however, the only statutory protection for conscience is to be found in the 1967 and 1990 
Acts; no such protection exists in relation to other contested practices, such as the provision 
of emergency contraception or the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment. Nevertheless, 
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0F+DOHKDVQRWHGDQµLQFUHPHQWDOH[WHQVLRQRI³RSW-RXW´DFURVV KHDOWKFDUH¶11 First, she cites 
the suggestion in the Code of Practice to the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 that although 
+&3V µPXVW QRW VLPSO\ DEDQGRQ SDWLHQWV RU FDXVH WKHLU FDUH WR VXIIHU¶ WKH\ QHHG QRW µGR
VRPHWKLQJWKDWJRHVDJDLQVWWKHLUEHOLHIV¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIOLIH-sustaining treatment.12 Second, 
she notes Butler-6ORVV/-¶Vstatement in Re B that where a doctor has difficulty in complying 
ZLWKDUHTXHVWWRZLWKGUDZWUHDWPHQWIURPDQDGXOWZLWKFDSDFLW\VKHKDVDµGXW\ (...) to find 
other doctors who will do so¶.13 McHale cautions that µthere is a danger [to patients]  in 
DOORZLQJ ³opt-out´ to be seen as an entitlement gradually through guidance, without 
legitimacy and the boundaries of such an opt-out being subject to a thorough 
reconsideration¶.14 Here, we examine general guidance on CBEs from key regulatory and 
professional bodies in England and Wales, and some of their specific guidance on medical 
treatments beyond those covered by the two Acts, in order to test this claim of an incremental 
extension of CBEs through guidance. 
 
A. Guidance on conscience: Entitlements and obligations 
 
Matters of conscience are discussed in guidance issued by the healthcare SURIHVVLRQV¶ 
regulatory bodies, the General Medical Council (GMC), General Pharmaceutical Council 
(GPC), and Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), and also in guidance from the British 
Medical Association (BMA) and the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP).15 The 
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extent of the discussion varies, as does the consideration given to the obligations of a HCP 
seeking to exercise a CBE. The NMC states only WKDW µWKH ODZV RI WKH FRXQWU\¶ PXVW be 
complied with,16 and the GPC refers, without further elaboration, WR µUHOLJLRXV RU PRUDO
beliefs [which] prevent you from providing a service¶.17 The BMA indicates support for 
doctors who seek CBEs from withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults with 
capacity,18 claiming that this hDV µVRPH VXSSRUW¶ LQ WKH 0&$¶V Code of Practice.19  
Furthermore, in its guidance on Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment, the BMA claims 
that the courts support the idea that doctors ought not to be compelled to act against their 
consciences,20 FLWLQJ+HGOH\-¶VFRPPHQWLQWyatt WKDWµit was recognised on all sides that a 
doctor could not be required to act contrary to his conscience. The Court of Appeal have 
made it clear that a court should not require any doctor so to act.¶21  It appears, however, that 
despite using the term µconscience¶, Hedley J was referring to the HCP¶Vclinical judgment, 
and this is supported by his reference to Lord Donaldson MR in Re J, who spoke of µWKHERQD
fide clinical judgment of the practitionHU FRQFHUQHG¶22 Subsequent paragraphs in Wyatt 
confirm that Hedley J was concerned with clinical rather than moral judgement. Indeed, he 
noted WKDW WKH µprofessional conscience of a doctor will of course have been honed by 
experience of patients, exposure WR WKHSUDFWLFHRIFROOHDJXHVDQG WKHHWKRVRIKLVZRUN¶23 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(BMA) Ethics Department, 0HGLFDO(WKLFV7RGD\7KH%0$¶V+DQGERRNRI(WKLFVDQG/DZ (Wiley-Blackwell: 
Oxford, 3rd edn, 2013); Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP), Good Medical Practice for General 
Practitioners (RCGP: London, 2008). 
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 NMC, The code: Standards of conduct, performance and ethics for nurses and midwives (NMC: London, 
2008) para. 49. 
17
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doctors-beliefs> accessed 28 July 2014.  ,QWKDWGRFXPHQW WKH%0$GRHVKRZHYHUVWDWHWKDW µGRFWRUVVKRXOG
have a right¶WR&2LQWKHVHWKUHHDUHDVµZKHUHWKHUHLVDQRWKHUGRFWRUZLOOLQJWRWDNHRYHUWKHSDWLHQW¶VFDUH¶
emphasis added.  Referring to DCA (n 12) paras 9.61-9.63. 
20
 BMA, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment (Blackwell: London, 3rd edn, 2007), 
para. 16.1. 
21
 Re Wyatt [2005] EWHC 2293 (Fam), [32], emphasis added. 
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 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15, 26-27, emphasis added. 
23
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and also referred WRµprofessional FRQVFLHQFHLQWXLWLRQRUKXQFK¶24 Thus, we suggest that this 
authority supports the right of doctors not to be compelled to act against their clinical 
judgement, rather than any general right of conscience. Nevertheless, the BMA considers 
that: 
 
there is no reason why reasonable and lawful requests by doctors to exercise a 
conscientious objection to other procedures should not be considered, providing 
individual patients are not disadvantaged and continuity of care for other patients can 
be maintained.  In these circumstances, conscientious objection should not be seen as 
DµULJKW¶EXWLQGLYLGXDOUHTXHVWVVKRXOGEHDVVHVVHGRQWKHLUPHULWV25 
 
The RCGP and the GMC also adopt a liberal approach to CBEs, with the RCGP assuming 
that wide-ranging opt-outs WR µa particular form of treatment¶ will be possible,26 and the 
*0& DGYLVLQJ WKDW D GRFWRU PD\ µFKRRVH WR RSW RXW RI SURYLGLQJ a particular procedure 
because of [her] pHUVRQDOEHOLHIVDQGYDOXHV¶,27 providing that the objection is explained to 
patients.28   
 In terms of REMHFWRUV¶ REOLJDWLRQV QXUVHV DQG PLGZLYHV are advised that they must 
LQIRUPWKHLUHPSOR\HUVLQZULWLQJRIWKHLUREMHFWLRQµDWWKHHDUOLHVWGDWHLQWKHLUHPSOR\PHQW¶
and are cautioned that they might be called to justify their actions in court.29 The GMC¶V and 
GPC¶V guidance states that doctors and pharmacists should inform employers, partners, 
colleagues, and relevant authorities of their views, so that patient care is not compromised as 
others can deal with the services that are affected by the belief, and colleagues are not 
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overburdened.30 Pharmacists are also instructed to know where patients requesting an 
objected-to service may be directed to for alternative provision,31 and to ensure that patients 
DUH µSURSHUO\ LQIRUPHG¶ of the reason why the service in question is not being made 
available.32 Both the NMC and GPC advise their members to consider their conscientious 
position when deciding where to work,33 and the BMA, GMC, and GPC require doctors to 
explain their position to their patients, inform them of their right to see another doctor, and 
provide them with information to enable them to exercise that right.34 In some instances, 
according to the BMA and GMC, doctors should even arrange an appointment for the patient 
with another doctor.35 Furthermore, tKH*0&VWDWHVWKDWDGRFWRU¶VGHFLVLRQQRWWRSURYLGHD
particular procedure must not result in direct or indirect discrimination against, or harassment 
of, any patient or group of patients: so, for example, a doctor may decide not to provide any 
contraceptive services to patients at all, but she may not decide to provide them only to 
married women.36 'RFWRUVPXVWµGR>WKHLU@EHVW¶WRHQVure that patients know of any CBE in 
advance,37 DQGPXVWQRWH[SUHVV WKHLUSHUVRQDOEHOLHIV LQZD\VµWKDWH[SORLW WKHLU>SDWLHQWV¶@
YXOQHUDELOLW\RUDUHOLNHO\WRFDXVHWKHPGLVWUHVV¶38 
 
B. Guidance on conscience in relation to particular treatments 
 
The GMC, GPC, RCGP, and BMA all support an extension of CBEs beyond the two areas 
where conscience is already protected by statute. Evidence of a willingness to extend 
conscience provision beyond the existing statutory protections is also evident in some of the 
                                                          
30
 GMC (n 15) para 11; GPC (n 15) para 1.3.  Also, GPC (n 17) para 3.4. 
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guidance on specific procedures and treatments, and in the Bills on assisted suicide recently 
presented to the UK Parliament. As noted above, the BMA has indicated that it will support 
doctors who seek exemption from withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults without 
capacity,39 and the GMC has stated that doctors may be exempt in such a situation but must 
µILUVW>HQVXUH@WKDWDUUDQJHPHQWVKDYHEHHQPDGHIRUDQRWKHr doctor to take over your role¶.40  
As long ago as 1997 the BMA stated that a CBE for HCPs would be necessary were assisted 
dying to be legalised,41 DQG /RUG -RIIH¶V Assisted Dying Bills included CBE clauses.42 In 
2005, a House of Lords Select Committee Report on one of the Bills advised that imposing a 
duty of referral might violate Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.43  
Perhaps in the light of this advice, the CBE clause in Lord Falconer¶V current Assisted Dying 
(HL) Bill resembles section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967, which, on its face, contains no duty 
to refer.44  As we have noted, however, a duty to refer in relation to abortion is imposed on 
GPs and others by secondary legislation. 
 In relation to the provision of emergency contraception, the GPC recognises that 
pharmacists might wish to be exempt, and requires those who do to refer patients to non-
objecting pharmacists.45 6LPLODUO\ WKH %0$ VWDWHV WKDW µGRFWRUV ZLWK D FRQVFLHQWLRXV
objection to providing contraceptive advice or treatment have an ethical duty to refer their 
patients to another practitioner or family planning service¶.46 Insofar as this countenances 
objection to types of contraception other than those regarded as constituting abortion, this 
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 BMA (n 15) 33. 
40
 GMC, Treatment and care toward the end of life: Good practice in decision making (GMC: London, 2010) 
para 79, emphasis added. 
41
 BMA, End-of-life decisions: Views of the BMA (BMA: London, 1997).  Now see, BMA, End-of-life 
decisions: Views of the BMA (BMA: London, 2009) 5. 
42
 Clause 6(2)-(3) Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill [HL] 2003-04; clause 7(2)-(3) Assisted Dying for the Terminally 
Il Bill 2004-05. 
43
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (2005) Recommendation 
269 (viii) referring to House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Scrutiny of 
Bills: Fifth Progress Report, Twelfth Report of Session 2003-04, HL Paper 93/HC 603, paras. 3.11-3.16. 
44
 Clause 5 Assisted Dying [HL] Bill 2014-15.  Note that the Assisted Suicide (Scotland) Bill 2013 contains no 
provision for CBEs. 
45
 GPC (n 15) 3. 
46
 BMA (n 15) 277, emphasis added. 
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further extends the scope RI&%(V,QFRQWUDVWDFFRUGLQJWRWKH*3&WKH10&¶VJXLGDQFH
Conscientious Objection (not publicly-available on the NMC website) states that a refusal to 
SURYLGHHPHUJHQF\KRUPRQDOFRQWUDFHSWLRQZRXOGFRQWUDYHQHWKH10&¶VUHJXODWRU\Code.47  
Presumably, this is because the Code requires nurses and midwives to comply with the law of 
the country in which they are practising,48 and emergency contraception is lawful in England 
and Wales. Finally, in the first edition of Medical Ethics Today in 1993, the BMA stated that 
doctors could have a CBE to being involved in surrogacy arrangements, and also to advance 
decisions.49 Although these statements are not repeated in the 2013 edition, they demonstrate 
that the BMA has been willing to extend protection for conscience beyond the legal 
protection offered by statute; albeit perhaps not to the same extent as the GMC. 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
An examination of the guidance provided by professional organisations appears to 
corroborate concerns about µconscience creep¶, as some of it envisages a role for CBEs 
beyond the two statutorily protected areas.  There is a lack of clarity about which treatments a 
HCP may validly seek exemption from, and also about the obligations of HCPs seeking to 
exercise CBEs, including whether they are obliged to inform patients in advance of the 
conscientious position, and/or to refer them to a non-objector who will provide the treatment. 
Vagueness within individual guidance documents, combined with the inconsistencies across 
the guidance offered by different organisations, leaves matters unclear for HCPs and patients. 
This leaves the door open for µFUHHS¶YLD the ad hoc interpretation and extension of CBEs.  
                                                          
47
 *3&µ5HYLHZRI6WDQGDUG± UHOLJLRXVRUPRUDOEHOLHIVLQWHULPXSGDWH¶&RXQFLOPHHWLQJth April 2012, 
04.12/C/01, para. 3.3. 
48
 NMC (n 16) para 49. 
49
 BMA, Medical Ethics Today: Its Practice and Philosophy (BMA: London, 1993) 121 and 163 respectively. 
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While the extension of CBEs may be warranted, if it is to occur it must be systematic and 
clearly justified so that patients and HCPs will know where they stand. 
 
 
III. THE NATURAL LIMITS OF CBEs: THREE RESTRICTING FACTORS 
 
We recommend that three limits be applied to restrict the operation of CBEs: (i) CBEs apply 
only to those treatments whose status as µproper medical treatment¶ is contested or liminal; 
(ii) a set of criteria can be identified which must be met before a claim can be regarded as 
JHQXLQHO\ µFRQVFLHQWLRXV¶ DQG ZKLFK HQDEOHV WKH UHMHFWLRQ RI LQHOLJLEOH FODLPV; and (iii) 
where a genuinely conscientious claim exists, a number of duties arise which the genuinely 
conscientious HCP must fulfil. These are restricting factors, insofar as they prescribe limits 
for CBEs and impose certain controls on their operation, thus removing the danger of CBEs 
HLWKHUµFUHHSLQJ¶into iOOLFLWDUHDVRURSHUDWLQJLQDµZLOG¶, uncontrolled manner. 
 
A. The margins of ³proper medical treatment´: CBE as a liminal phenomenon 
 
Savulescu has notoriously declared WKDW µ>L@I SHRSOH DUH QRW SUHSDUHG WR RIIHU legally 
permitted, efficient, and beneficial care to a patient because it conflicts with their values, they 
VKRXOGQRWEHGRFWRUV¶.50 Kennedy has denied the validity of CBEs where lawful treatment is 
concerned, complaining WKDWVHFWLRQRIWKH$ERUWLRQ$FWHQWLWOHVµDGRFWRUHPSOR\HG
DQGSDLGE\WKHWD[SD\HU«WRRSWRXWRISURYLGLQJDVHUYLFHYRWHGIRUDQGSDLGIRUE\WKH
taxpayer iIKHGRHVQRWWKLQNLWULJKW¶51 He contrasts this with the fact that a barrister cannot 
                                                          
50
 -6DYXOHVFX µ&RQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQ LQPHGLFLQH¶ British Medical Journal 294, 294, emphasis 
added.  See also Cantor (n 2) 1485. 
51
 , .HQQHG\ µ:KDW LV D PHGLFDO GHFLVLRQ?¶ LQ Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1988) 28. 
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refuse to represent a client on the basis that she will not represent terrorists. Those who work 
ZLWKLQWKH1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6HUYLFHDFFRUGLQJWR.HQQHG\µVKRXOGUHPHPber the last word of 
thH WKUHH ³VHUYLFH´ DQG VHUYH¶.52 Critics of CBEs pose a fundamental question: to what 
extent, if any, is the exercise of individual conscience compatible with proper medical 
treatment? If a treatment is ³proper´, should professionals be allowed to avoid providing it? 
Conversely, can the existence of a CBE be taken as an indication that the status of a particular 
treatment as proper medical treatment is in some way liminal, or even doubtful? 
 The legal concept of proper medical treatment has emerged from the role of the 
criminal law in regulating healthcare practice. In England and Wales, the concept neutralises 
prima facie wrongs and protects HCPs against prosecution for assault or grievous bodily 
harm. In R v Brown a majority in the House of Lords held that while the valid consent of a 
person with capacity was necessary to render significant bodily harm lawful, it was not 
sufficient; the physical contact must also be justifiable in the broader public interest.53 Proper 
medical treatment is one such justification,54 and in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland Lord Mustill 
VWDWHG WKDW µERGLO\ LQYDVLRQV LQ WKH FRXUVH RI SURSHU PHGLFDO WUHDWPHQW VWDQG FRPSOHWHO\
RXWVLGHWKHFULPLQDOODZ¶55 Other notions of proper medical treatment also emerge from the 
acceptance or rejection of particular practices by the medical profession and medical 
SURIHVVLRQDOVµUHFRJQL]HGSURIHVVLRQDOQRUPV¶).56 Recall, for example, the controversy in the 
late 1990s DURXQG 5REHUW 6PLWK¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR DPSXWDWH WKH KHDOWK\ OLPEV Rf consenting 
patients with capacity.57 Similarly, debates on whether HCPs should be involved in ritual 
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 Kennedy (n 51) 29. 
53
 [1994] 1 AC 212, HL. 
54
 Brown (n 53) 266 per Lord Mustill. 
55
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 891. 
56
 Wicclair (n 7) 222. 
57
 5&6PLWKµ%RG\LQWHJULW\LGHQWLW\GLVRUGHU$SUREOHPRISHUFHSWLRQ"¶LQ$$OJKUDQL5%HQQHWW62VW
(eds.), Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law Volume 1: The Criminal Law and Bioethical Conflict: 
Walking the Tightrope (CUP: Cambridge, 2013). 
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circumcision or assisted dying highlight the fact that, however long-established a practice, its 
characterisation and acceptance as ³proper´ can be continually contested. 
 While the meaning and scope of proper medical treatment may be unclear,58 our focus 
here is on whether HCPs should be able to refuse to provide treatments which have been 
deemed, by some mechanism, to be proper. Where a particular practice is deemed improper, 
it is meaningless to talk about CBEs, because expectation is critical. As there is no 
expectation that HCPs will engage in, for example, trepanation or female genital mutilation, 
there is no need to provide for exemptions from participation in these procedures. CBEs 
operate as a bulwark against expectation, and in the absence of any expectation that 
UHDVRQDEOH+&3VZLOOHQJDJHLQDSUDFWLFHWKHµVKLHOG¶RID&%(LVXQQHFHVVDU\59 A CBE is 
also inappropriate where a practice is so uncontroversial and well-accepted by the professions 
that it falls well within the medical mainstream. It would seem absurd to provide for CBEs 
from prescribing antibiotics for acne, performing tonsillectomy, or removing atypical moles, 
for example. Again, as there is no expectation that any reasonable HCP would dissent from 
participating in these practices, protection for conscience is unnecessary and inappropriate.  
$V )UDGHU DQG %RVN DUJXH µZKHUH VRFLHW\ SHUPLWV SDWLHQWV WR REWDLQ PHGLFDO VHUYLFHV DQG
where no clear-cut moral consensus opposes those services, physicians who invoke CO to 
providing those services risk abusive exercise of their state-OLFHQVHGSRZHUDQGDXWKRULW\¶60 
 Where the status of a treatment or procedure is clearly within or without accepted 
medical practice there is no need for CBEs. CBEs belong only at the margins of proper 
                                                          
58
 )RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQVHH0%UD]LHU6)RYDUJXHµ7UDQVIRUPLQJ ZURQJLQWRULJKW:KDWLV³SURSHUPHGLFDO
WUHDWPHQW´"¶LQ6)RYDUJXH$0XOORFNHGVThe Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the Medical 
Exception? (Routledge: London, 2015) forthcoming. 
59
 On CBE as a µshield¶ VHH IRU HJ % 'LFNHQV µ&RQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQ $ VKLHOG RU D VZRUG"¶ LQ 6$0
McLean (ed) First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006). 
60
 - )UDGHU &/ %RVN µ7KH SHUVRQDO LV SROLWLFDO WKH SURIHVVLRQDO LV QRW &RQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQ WR
obtaining/providing/actLQJRQJHQHWLFLQIRUPDWLRQ¶&American Journal of Medical Genetics Part C 
(Seminars in Medical Genetics) 62, 65. 
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medical treatment where the status of the treatment is contested.61 A treatment may occupy 
OLPLQDO VWDWXVEHFDXVHGHVSLWHEHLQJ ODZIXO LW LV µPRUDOO\ FRQWURYHUVLDO DQG FRQWHQWLRXV¶62  
Practices which involve the ending of human life, such as abortion, IVF, and withholding or 
withdrawing treatment from unconscious patients or severely disabled newborns, may be 
liminally proper for this reason; assisted dying will be too, if it becomes lawful to provide it 
within the healthcare context. Wicclair has noted a lack of moral consensus among HCPs and 
the public regarding physician assisted suicide in England and Wales and in the US, and 
suggests WKDW VXFK µPRUDO FRQWURYHUV\ GLsagreement, and uncertainty seem to recommend 
WROHUDQFH DQG WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI FRQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQ¶63 A treatment may also have 
liminal status if it is extremely risky or experimental, or if it is more concerned with the 
satisfaction of preferences than with healing or treating disease (as is arguably true of certain 
cosmetic procedures, and assisted reproduction for same sex couples and single people).  
CBEs should be permitted only in liminal cases of proper medical treatment where they 
µ[promote] the moral integrity of the medical profession DVZHOODVWKHLQGLYLGXDOSK\VLFLDQ¶64 
E\UHFRJQLVLQJ WKDW µWKHUHDUHVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVDPRQJDSSHDOV WRFRQVFLHQFHIURPWKH
SHUVSHFWLYHRIUHFRJQL]HGSURIHVVLRQDOQRUPV¶65  
 
B. Criteria for conscientiousness 
 
For a CBE to be valid it has been suggested that some or all of the following must be met: (i) 
the position held must be sincere;66 (ii) it must fit within a coherent system of ethical belief;67 
                                                          
61
 The BMA would appear to support this position: BMA (n 17) 2; as do :LFFODLUQ.*UHHQDZDOWµ5HIXVDO 
of conscience: What are tKH\DQGZKHQVKRXOGWKH\EHDFFRPPRGDWHG"¶Ave Maria Law Review 47; M 
0DJHOVVHQµ:KHQVKRXOGFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQEHDFFHSWHG"¶Journal of Medical Ethics 18. 
62
 Wicclair (n 7) 207. 
63
 Wicclair (n 7) 206. 
64
 Wicclair (n 7) 223, emphasis in original. 
65
 Wicclair (n 7) 222. 
66
 &0H\HUV5':RRGVµ$QREOLJDWLRQWRSURYLGHDERUWLRQVHUYLFHV:KDWKDSSHQVZKHQSK\VLFLDQVUHIXVH"¶
(1996) 22 Journal of Medical Ethics (/D)ROOHWWH+/D)ROOHWWHµ3ULYDWHFRQVFLHQFHSXEOLFDFWV¶
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(iii) it must EH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH +&3¶V RWKHU EHOLHIV DQG actions, particularly those in 
proximate areas of concern;68 (iv) it must be key or fundamental in the sense that its violation 
SRVHVDVHULRXVULVNWRWKH+&3¶VPRUDOLQWHJULW\;69 (v) reasonable alternatives must have been 
considered so that the exercise of D&%(LVD µODVW UHVRUW¶;70 (vi) the HCP seeking the CBE 
PXVWEHDEOHWRµDUWLFXODWHWKHEDVLVRI>KHU@SRVLWLRQ¶;71 (vii) the rationale must reflect a valid 
view of the ends/goals of medicine;72 (viii) the position must not be intolerant or disrespect 
the different conscientious conclusions of others;73 and (ix) the objection must be to the 
treatment, rather than to the individual patient.74  
 A conscientious position is DQµHWKLFDO¶SRVLWLRQLQWZRVHQVHV First, it pertains to or 
concerns ethical matters; second, it is embraced (when genuinely-held) on the basis that it is 
believed to be in accordance with the requirements of ethics. Insofar as conscientious 
SRVLWLRQV DUH µHWKLFDO¶ LQ WKLV VHFRQG VHQVH it seems impossible to acknowledge as truly 
conscientious any position which fails to meet basic ethical requirements such as sincerity, 
good faith, and respect for others, including others with whom one disagrees. If this is 
correct, some criteria naturally flow from genuine conscientiousness; criterion (i) seems 
uncontroversial on this basis/LNHZLVHFULWHULRQYLLLVHHPVLQWXLWLYHO\FRUUHFWDVµ>L@WZRXOG
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Journal of Medical Ethics 5)&DUG µ5HDVRQDELOLW\ DQG FRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQ LQ PHGLFLQH $ UHSO\ WR
Marsh and an elaboration of the reason-JLYLQJUHTXLUHPHQW¶Bioethics 320. 
67
 Meyers and Woods (n 66); Greenawalt (n 61). 
68
 Meyers and Woods (n 66); LaFollette and LaFollette (n 66). 
69
 Meyers and Woods (n 66/&DQQROGµ&RQVHTXHQFHVIRUSDWLHQWVRIKHDOWKFDUHSURIHVVLRQDOV¶FRQVFLHQWLRXV
DFWLRQV7KHEDQRQDERUWLRQV LQ6RXWK$XVWUDOLD¶  Journal of Medical Ethics 80; Magelssen (n 61).  
For an argument that moral integrity is the basis for CBEs see Wicclair (n 7). 
70
 Meyers and Woods (n 66). 
71
 Meyers and Woods (n 667$&DYDQDXJKµ3URIHVVLRQDOFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQLQPHGLFLQHZLWKDWWHQWLRQ
WR UHIHUUDO¶ Ave Maria Law Review 189.  Magelssen (n 61) and LaFollette and LaFollette (n 66) go 
further requiring that the HCP gives a plausible rationale for her position.  On the need to give reasons in 
support of a CBE see Card (n 66IRUDFRQWUDU\YLHZVHH-0DUVKµ&RQVFLHQWLRXVUHfusals and reason-JLYLQJ¶
(2014) 28 Bioethics  DQG IRU µD PLGGOH JURXQG SRVLWLRQ¶ see / .DQW\PLU & 0F/HRG µ-XVWLILFDWLRQ IRU
FRQVFLHQFHH[HPSWLRQVLQKHDOWKFDUH¶Bioethics 16. 
72
 Cavanaugh (n 71); Magelssen (n 61). 
73
 LaFollette and LaFollette (n 66'6XOPDV\ µ:KDW LVFRQVFLHQFHDQGZK\ LV UHVSHFW IRU LW VR LPSRUWDQW"¶
(2008) 29 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 135; B Dickens, µ/HJDO SURWHFWLRQ DQG OLPLWV RI FRQVFLHQWLRXV
REMHFWLRQ:KHQFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQLVXQHWKLFDO¶ 28 Medicine and Law 337, 343. 
74
 Cavanaugh (n 71); BMA (n 19). 
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seem unjust for a person to ask for tolerance for an intolerant belief. A moral system that 
WROHUDWHGLQWROHUDQFHZRXOGVHHPLQWHUQDOO\LQFRQVLVWHQW¶75 
 Someone who is committed to behaving ethically should also be willing to make a 
good faith attempt to articulate her position upon request. A version of criterion (vi) is 
justified, therefore, although the emphasis must be on the HCP¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRDUWLFXlate and 
not on the plausibility of her rationale, since the latter depends on the receptiveness of the 
audience and not the conscientiousness of the position. Conscience is an element of moral 
agency; a matter of reflection, deliberation, and judgement. As such, a good faith exercise of 
conscience ought to include a willingness to try to externalise these processes in order to 
alleviate any legitimate concerns about the subjective elements of conscience, particularly 
fears that some HCPs may exploit CBEs by making false claims.76 While criteria (i), (vi) and 
(viii) emerge from the very nature of conscientiousness, criterion (iv) emerges from the 
purpose of a CBE. Insofar as CBEs are justified by the need to protect integrity, they can 
only be justified when there is a reasonable prospect of an integrity violation. Whether there 
is such a thing as a µtrivial¶ violation of conscience, or whether all violations of conscience 
impact on integrity to some extent, is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, if the 
UDLVRQG¶rWUHRI&%(VLVWKHSURWHFWLRQRILQWHJULW\then the prospect of an integrity violation 
should be regarded as a criterion for the availability of a CBE. 
 The remaining criteria are problematic in various ways. It seems too onerous to 
require that the position held must fit within a coherent system of ethical belief (criterion 
(ii)); who can claim that her ethical beliefs are FRKHUHQWRUIRUPDµV\VWHP¶ at all? It is also 
unclear why a conscientious position must be located within a coherent system to be valid.  
Requiring such might privilege religious objections which occur against a consistent doctrinal 
framework over secular ethical objections. Arguably, there is at least a danger that a 
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 Sulmasy (n 73) 146. 
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 Of particular note are the examples recounted by Meyers and Woods (n 66). 
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coherence requirement may cause those who cite the doctrinal position of a major world 
religion as the basis for their objections to benefit from an implicit presumption of coherence.  
 Criterion (iii) FRQVLVWHQF\ ZLWK WKH +&3¶V RWKHU EHOLHIV DQG DFWLRQV seems to 
envisage an unduly high level of scrutiny of LQGLYLGXDOV¶ LQQHU OLYHV. If the rationale is that 
only those who manage consistently to live up to all or most of their moral ideals ought to be 
able to access CBEs, then it is too demanding. Given the negative consequences that have 
been associated with integrity violation,77 limiting protection in this way is prejudicial.  
Alternatively, if consistency is envisaged here as evidence of sincerity, then this is already 
covered in criterion (i), (the position held must be sincere). What if a HCP has two views 
which appear inconsistent but which she is satisfied she can justify? What if she opposes the 
destruction of embryos in IVF because she regards foetal and embryonic human life as 
valuable, but supports abortion in certain circumstances because she believes that, in the 
latter context, the interests of the woman take precedence? Or, she may oppose µsocial¶ 
abortions but support abortion in other situations. Are these positions consistent (because she 
can explain them) or inconsistent (because she seems to be upholding the sanctity of life in 
some cases and derogating from it in others)? If she cites a religious faith as any part of the 
justification for her position, is her consistency to be judged in terms of how consistently she 
applies its doctrines in other areas of her life? 
 Criterion (v), requiring that the exercise of a CBE be a last resort, is difficult to 
understand. If a HCP judges that participation in a particular practice will damage her 
integrity, the only thing that will avoid the damage is avoiding participation. What other 
options could be explored before she concludes that she is going to have to avail herself of a 
&%(DVD µODVW UHVRUW¶" Criterion (vii), requiring that the CBE must reflect one view of the 
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 ,QFOXGLQJ µJXLOW VKDPH RU ORVV RI VHOI-UHVSHFW¶: $+0 $QWRPPDULD µ&RQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQ LQ FOLQical 
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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ends/goals of medicine, seems to demand that HCPs suspend their personal ethical 
commitments while at work. But this undermines the very value (integrity) which conscience 
provisions aim to protect. Integrity must, by definition, abhor the kind of 
compartmentalisation which would deny anythLQJ RWKHU WKDQ D ³medical´ rationale for a 
healthcare refusal. Indeed, an ability to cast off oU VXVSHQGRQH¶VSHUVRQDO commitments is 
ethically suspect, and raises serious doubts about integrity and commitment. Healthcare is an 
inescapably moral enterprise,78 and integrity and commitment are essential to it.79 As such, it 
is those HCPs who lack these qualities who are unfit to perform their roles, and not those who 
permit personal commitments to inform their professional practice. As Curlin and others 
remark, µ>S@DWLHQWVZLOOQRW EHZHOO-served by moral automatons who shape their practices, 
without struggle or reflection, to the desires of patients and the dictates of whatever regime is 
FXUUHQWO\LQSRZHU¶80 
 Finally, criterion (ix), which requires that the µREMHFWLRQ¶ be to the treatment and not 
to the patient, has some intuitive appeal. It is central to any ethical position that certain 
practices must incur disapproval and be rejected, but responding ethically to other people 
means embracing not rejecting them, and treating them with respect even where we disagree 
with them about fundamental ethical issues or disapprove of their actions. Therefore, a 
stipulation WKDW+&3VPD\REMHFWWR³SUDFWLFHVEXWQRWSHUVRQV´appears reasonable. Imagine, 
however, that a HCP seeks a CBE from participating in so-called ³social abortions´, although 
VKHGRHVQRWGLVDSSURYHRI DERUWLRQZKHUH WKH ZRPDQ¶V OLIHRUKHDOWK LV DW LPPHGLDWH DQG
serious risk. Is that an objection to the practice or the patient?  It could surely be construed as 
either. A non-discrimination criterion might be workable if it could be formulated so as to 
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refer specifically to non-discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, religion, or sexual 
orientation, EXWIUDPHGLQWHUPVRIDQREMHFWLRQWRD³SUDFWLFHQRWDSDWLHQW´it is too vague. 
 From all of the above, we suggest that at least four criteria delineate the boundaries of 
what can properly be called a ³conscientious´ position, because they are either presupposed 
by the very nature of conscientiousness (1-3), or are entailed by the purpose of CBEs as 
being to protect the integrity of HCPs (4): 
 
1. The SRVLWLRQPXVWEHVLQFHUHWKH³VLQFHULW\FULWHULRQ´), 
2. The HCP seeking the CBE must be able to articulate the basis of her position (the 
³DUWLFXODWLRQFULWHULRQ´), 
3. The position must not be intolerant and must not disrespect the conscientious 
SRVLWLRQRIRWKHUVWKH³WROHUDQFHUHVSHFWFULWHULRQ´), and 
4.  The belief at stake must be key or fundamental so that its violation poses a serious 
ULVNWRWKH+&3¶V moral integrity WKH³LQWHJULW\FULWHULRQ´). 
 
C. Duties of HCPs exercising a CBE 
 
A number of duties have been proposed as properly belonging to HCPs who seek to exercise 
CBEs, including duties to (i) behave with sensitivity and respect toward patients, (ii) avoid 
creating unnecessary burdens for patients and colleagues, (iii) treat in an emergency, (iv) 
disclose conscientious positions in advance, (v) DUWLFXODWHRQH¶VSRVLWLRQ, (vi) provide other 
care, (vii) XQGHUVWDQG RQH¶V RZQ SRVLWLRQ, (viii) perform some alternative form of public-
benefiting professional service, (ix) refer, and (x) inform patients of their treatment options.  
We suggest that just as a claim can only be conscientious if certain criteria are fulfilled, some 
duties are entailed by the conscientious character of a CBE and can be accepted relatively 
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quickly and straightforwardly. Other proposed duties can be accepted only after some 
clarification and qualification, and VRPHFODLPHGµGXWLHV¶ ought not to be regarded as duties at 
all. 
 
1.  Duties clearly entailed by the conscientious character of a CBE 
The duty to behave respectfully toward others is a general (arguably the most general) ethical 
duty. One of us has observed, in another context, that all ethics is, ultimately, about requiring 
uV WR UHVSRQGDSSURSULDWHO\ WR WKHYXOQHUDELOLW\ RIRWKHUV VLQFH µ>L@W LVYXOQHUDELOLW\«RXU
RZQ DQG WKDWRIRWKHUV« WKDW ³SURYRNHV´ us to become ethical beings, capable of ethical 
UHVSRQVHV « LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI YXOQHUDELOLW\ WKHUH ZRXOG FRXOG EH QR HWKLFV¶81 In the 
healthcare setting, where vulnerability is often heightened and relationships are asymmetric 
in obvious ways, the general duty of respect comes into sharp focus. With regard to CBEs, 
there is a risk that patients may be distressed or feel judged or criticised by the knowledge 
that a HCP has declined to provide the treatment they seek. Magelssen acknowledges that 
µWKH PRUDO FULWLFLVP RI WKH SDWLHQW¶V LQWHQWLRQ LPSOLFLW LQ FRQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQ PD\ EH
LQHUDGLFDEOH¶EXWµLWPD\FHUWDLQO\EHGLPLQLVKHGLQIRUFH¶LI+&3VFRPPXQLFDWHWKHLUYLHZV
µQRQ-FRQIURQWDWLRQDOO\ DQG ZLWK VHQVLWLYLW\ WRZDUGV WKH YXOQHUDEOH SDWLHQW¶82 Thus, as a 
minimum: 
 
 the conscientious objecting professional incurs duties of sensitive, empathic 
 counselling and explanation to any patient or their proxy who asks for a service that 
 could be expected in her situation but that the particular professional will not 
 perform.83  
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The duty to behave with sensitivity and respect towards patients, duty (i), arises fairly 
straightforwardly from the ethical nature of a conscientious position, and overlaps with the 
criteria which are entailed by genuine conscientiousness; particularly the tolerance/respect 
criterion (criterion 3).  
 Furthermore, the general duty of respect to others from which this first duty flows 
also gives rise to duty (ii), to avoid creating unnecessary burdens for patients and colleagues.  
In 0DJHOVVHQ¶VYLHZ the HCP who exercises a CBE has an active duty to reduce any burden 
for patients because µthis would signal that his objection is based on a noble moral motive ± 
the protection of his own integrity ± and that he has not lost sight of his duty to promote the 
SDWLHQW¶V LQWHUHVWV¶84 A genuinely conscientious HCP acting out of a sense of ethical 
obligation can, thus, be expected not to create unnecessary burdens for patients and 
colleagues. An important caveat here iV WKDW QRW DOO EXUGHQV ZLOO EH ³XQQHFHVVDU\´; 
accommodating CBEs will inevitably entail some management consequences which 
necessarily burden patients and colleagues to a degree. 
  Regarding the duty to treat in an emergency, duty (iii), there is a broad consensus that 
CBEs do not extend to medical emergencies, so that in an emergency a HCP who is 
ordinarily exempt from providing certain treatment(s) becomes obliged to treat.85 Going 
further, Magelssen insists that µDKHDOWKFDUHZRUNHU¶VREMHFWLRQWRSURYLGLQJSRWHQWLDOO\OLIH-
saving treatment should not be accepted¶86 and Sulmasy DFFHSWV WKDW µlikely and imminent 
rLVNRIDFWXDO LOOQHVVRU LQMXU\¶ is sufficieQW UHDVRQ WR µFRPSHOFRQVFLHQFH¶QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ
WKDW µWKH JURXQGV IRU FRQWUDYHQLQJ VRPHRQH¶V FRQVFLHQWLRXV Gisagreement must be very 
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VWURQJ¶ DQG WKDW µinconvenience, psychological distress, or mild symptoms would not be 
VXIILFLHQW¶.87 CBEs should not be construed as permitting HCPs to refuse the relevant 
treatment where it is required in order to save a SDWLHQW¶V OLIH RU SURWHFW her from serious 
injury. $ZLOOLQJQHVVWRGLHIRURQH¶VRZQSULQFLSOHVPD\LQVRPHFLUFXPVWDQFHVEHKHURLF
but when a HCP is content for her patients to die (or be seriously injured) for her principles, 
then her conscience has become an end-in-itself and a liability. 
 
2. Duties accepted with qualification 
Duty (iv), to disclose RQH¶V conscientious position in advance, can be conceived narrowly (as 
requiring disclosure to current patients only),88 or more widely to LQFRUSRUDWH µRQH¶V 
prospective and current patients, colleagues, employers, and relevant institutions, for example 
KRVSLWDOVDQG LQVXUDQFHFRPSDQLHV¶89 Requiring advance notice to patients enables them to 
seek an alternative doctor if they wish,90 but it may not work µwhen patients need care 
TXLFNO\RUZKHQQRRQHHOVHFDQWDNHRYHUWKHWDVNRIWKHREMHFWLQJSURIHVVLRQDO¶.91 Where it 
is practicable, however, advance notice to patients decreases the possibility that a refusal will 
eventuate DQGµGLVUXSWWKHWUXVW¶EHWZHHQSDWLHQWand HCP.92  Such disclosure might include a 
FRXUWHRXVH[SODQDWLRQRIµZK\FHUWDLQSURFHGXUHVDUHQRWPRUDOO\DFFHSWDEOH¶ WR WKH+&3,93  
but although µDFRQVLGHUDWHDQGFRQVLGHUHGDQVZHU¶VKRXOGEHJLYHQwhen a patient requests 
an explanation, µ>SDWLHQWV@ ZKR DUH QRW LQWHUHVWHG RXJKW QRW WR EH WUHDWHG DV FDSWLYH
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DXGLHQFHV¶94  Disclosure to employers µDOORZ>V@LQVWLWXWLRQVWRSUHSDUHIRULQGLYLGXDOUHIusals 
«DQGSXWDV\VWHPLQSODFHWRJXDUDQWHHVHDPOHVVGHOLYHU\RIFDUH¶.95   
 Disclosure may not always be in the SDWLHQW¶V best interests,96 however, and a practice 
of disclosure may create risks for HCPs.97 When an issue is as divisive as (say) abortion, 
publicly identifying objectors and non-objectors may leave each group vulnerable to attack 
from extremists on the ³other side´. Disclosure necessitates a balancing exercise in which the 
potential disadvantages of non-disclosure for patients and institutions are weighed against the 
potential risks for HCPs of having a disclosure requirement. The outcome of such an exercise 
is likely to be different in different social contexts. In England and Wales the abortion debate, 
although robust, has (so far) been nonviolent, and the risks associated with disclosure are 
likely to be regarded as low. In the US, where HCPs have been murdered because of their 
roles as abortion providers, disclosure must be regarded as higher risk.98 Thus, although a 
duty of disclosure is indicated by the values of honesty and respect for others, disclosure 
should only be required if it is judged to be achievable without posing an unacceptable risk to 
the physical and psychological safety of HCPs. 
 We have suggested that willingness to articuODWH RQH¶V SRVLWLRQ is an indicator of 
genuine conscientiousness, and is one of the criteria for the existence of a CBE.  Others have 
gone further and suggested that there is a duty to articulate on the part of HCPs who exercise 
CBEs (duty (v)). This claim has been expressed in the ³genuineness requirement´, of which 
Meyers and Woods99 are the main advocates. OEMHFWRUVµmust demonstrate to outsiders (say a 
diverse committee) that their conscience is genuine ± that is, a deep feature of their person 
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and not a FRYHUXSIRUTXHVWLRQDEOHELDVHVRUSUHMXGLFHV¶100 In other words, they must prove 
µthat having to perform the relevant duty would cause [the HCP] unwarranted moral and 
SV\FKRORJLFDO GLVWUHVV¶101 One problem with this is that refusals may be genuine but still 
unethical.  If genuineness is the only requirement there is no basis on which to disallow, say, 
discriminatory refusals which meet that test.102 Furthermore, it is questionable whether 
genuineness can be ³proven´ at all. A good actor may be able to convince her audience 
regardless of veracity, whereas someone with a genuine objection might struggle to convince 
due to inarticulacy, nerves, or diffidence. 
 $OWHUQDWLYHO\ WKH GXW\ WR DUWLFXODWH FDQ EH H[SUHVVHG DV WKH ³reasonableness 
UHTXLUHPHQW´, advocated by Card, Cavanaugh and Magelssen,103 according to which µ>W@KH
objector must be capable of giving reasons accessible to others, in contrast to asserting an 
entirely personal VWDQFH¶104 Under this requirement, those seeking CBEs would be obliged to 
cite µJRRG rHDVRQV « UHDVRQV WKDW RWKHUV VKRXOG DFFHSW¶.105 This version of the duty, it is 
claimed, precludes permitting exemptions grounded on baseless or discriminatory beliefs 
since µFRQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQV PRWLYDWHG E\ VXFK EHOLHIV FRXOG QRW EH UHDVRQDEOH¶106 But 
how LV ³reasonableness´ to be determined? Ought HCPV¶ YLHZV to be subject to a 
³reasonableness test´, similar to the legal test of the reasonable clinician espoused in 
Bolam?107 If so, the HCP seeking to exercise a CBE need only point to the existence of other 
HCPs who agree with her, and demonstrate that their shared position is, in essence, logically 
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defensible.108 And what of metaphysical beliefs, such as that the human foetus possesses a 
soul? Can these ever form a µreasonable¶ basis for a CBE?109 As Marsh observes: 
 
 arguably most refusals « are metaphysically or religiously based, meaning that they 
 make  little or no sense in the absence of certain controversial metaphysical or 
 religious assumptions « when we are in contexts of metaphysical disagreement and 
 we adopt a demanding public conception of rationality, refusals will likely never, or 
 virtually never, be justified.110 
 
Kantymir and McLeod suggest that while µ>D@UHIXVDOVKRXOGQRWKDYHWREHUHDVRQDEOHIRUWKH
objector to receive some conscience proteFWLRQ«>D@WWKHVDPHWLPHQRWHYHU\UHIXVDOWKDWLV
JHQXLQH ZDUUDQWV DQ H[HPSWLRQ¶111 They propose a middle-ground position under which 
HCPs seeking exemption would be required to prove either reasonableness or genuineness, 
and to satisfy certain criteria, namely WKDW µpatients will still get the care they need in a 
respectful and timely fashion, any empirical beliefs on which the objection rests are not 
baseless, and the moral or religious beliefs on which it rests are not discriminatory¶.112 
 All versions of the duty to articulate raise procedural questions. Meyers and Woods 
UHFRPPHQG WKDW µa review board be established to evaluate claims of moral objection to 
providing abortions¶113 ZLWK LWV FRPSRVLWLRQ UHIOHFWLQJ µa diversity of racial, ethnic and 
religious beliefs and academic training « it should also include [representatives from] a 
UDQJH RI GLVFLSOLQHV¶.114 This process would begin relatively informally, as a discussion 
between the HCP and the committee, but could escalate WRµa court of competent jurisdiction¶ 
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with legal representation.115 Although this SURFHGXUH µrelies upon the adjudication of 
putatively normative reasons, which can be unrHOLDEOH¶,116 Kantymir and McLeod propose 
two ways of minimising arbitrariness or capriciousness. First, guidance for review panels in 
WKHIRUPRIDµhandbook on discrimination that outlines the different ways in which sexism, 
racism, and the like can manifest themselves¶117 and, secondlyDQDSSHDOVSURFHVV µso that 
poor decisions of review boards could be overturned¶118 
 Although we agree that µWKH DWWHPSW WR MXVWLI\RQH¶VYLHZV WRRWKHUV LQ DSOXUDOLVWLF
society shows respect for others as equal citizens¶DQG that µUHDVRQ-giving in front of a critical 
DXGLHQFHFDQEHDKHOSIXOZD\RIXQFRYHULQJXQMXVWLILHGELDVHV¶,119 we are not persuaded that 
a formal (and possibly adversarial) process leading to a ³verdict´ is desirable. In practice, the 
reason-giving process ought to look more like ³reflecting aloud´ than being ³called to 
account´. The point is to externalise the internal process of conscience (or try to) as a mark of 
sincerity and a gesture of respect for the moral community, and not to force a HCP to plead 
KHUFDVHLQDµGUDIWERDUG¶SURFHVVZKLFKµFDQEHGDPDJLQJWRPRUDOH«cannot detect skilled 
liars, and « may be incompetHQWRUFRUUXSW¶120 Furthermore, a HCP may have a deep and 
genuine moral unease but lack the intellectual or verbal skills to narrate it impressively, or 
she may be motivated purely by religious humility or obedience. Protection for conscience 
should not be contingent upon an ability to convince or persuade; thus, we cautiously endorse 
a duty to articulate providing that the process is informal and reflective, and that the aim is 
mutual understDQGLQJUDWKHUWKDQD³YHUGLFW´. 
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Cavanaugh maintains that µconscientious objector status bears exclusively on the patient's 
contested request; it does not relate to the other care the physician, nurse, or pharmacist 
provides for the patient.¶121 Duty (vi), to provide other care, requires careful enunciation. 
While we endorse a general duty along these lines, in practice the boundary between the 
FRQWHVWHG WUHDWPHQW DQG ³RWKHU FDUH´ can be fiercely contested. It is crucial, therefore, to 
uphold the duty of providing other care in a way that avoids violating the integrity of HCPs, 
either by effectively requiring their participation in the objectionable activity, or by forcing 
them into complicity (see our discussion under 3 below). Recent litigation in the UK courts 
concerning the interpretation of section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 highlights how thin the 
boundary between conteVWHGWUHDWPHQWVDQG³RWKHUFDUH´ can be.122 ³Good conscience´ may 
well demand that a HCP does not participate in any way in a practice held to be deeply 
immoral, and has been argued to cover such supposedly UHPRWHSDUWLFLSDWLRQDVµGHOHJDWLRQ 
VXSHUYLVLRQDQGVXSSRUW¶.123 
 Recalling the fundamental ethical duty to respond appropriately to the vulnerability of 
others, we suggest that a genuinely ethical position cannot entail a lack of compassion or 
care. Good conscience never demands that a HCP avoid feeding, toileting, comforting, 
listening, and other basic acts of care. Even if I regard the treatment a patient is receiving as 
immoral, it cannot be immoral for me to dry her tears if she is distressed, fetch her a glass of 
water if she is thirsty, or adjust her pillows if she is uncomfortable. It would be immoral not 
to do these things. Thus, the duty to provide other care, short of participation in the contested 
treatment, arises directly from the ethical nature of a conscientious position. 
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µ'XWLHV¶ZKLFKRXJKWWREHUHMHFWHG 
Regarding duty (vii), to understand RQH¶V own position, 3HOOHJULQR VXJJHVWV WKDW µPRUDO
maturity is part of integrity and requires knowing which acts destroy moral integrity and 
which dR QRW¶ DQG WKDW µSK\VLFLDQV ZKR OD\ FODLP WR PRUDO LQWHJULW\ DUH REOLJHG WR
comprehend their own beliefs sufficiently well to know when they can compromise and when 
QRW¶124 :HKDYHDOUHDG\SURSRVHGWKDWZLOOLQJQHVVWRDUWLFXODWHRQH¶VSRVLWLRQLVQRWRQO\a 
criterion for the validity of CBEs (criterion (2)), but also a duty for those who exercise them 
(duty (v)). These articulation requirements provide sufficient prompt to reflect, self-
VFUXWLQLVHDQGXQGHUVWDQGRQH¶V UHDVRQV: who, knowing she may be called upon to explain 
her position, will not reflect upon it privately in advance? An additional duty to understand 
RQH¶V RZQ SRVLWLRQ is unnecessary, and runs the risk of being interSUHWHG DV D µGXW\ WR EH
VXUH¶An ethical position can be genuine, reasonable, and authentically conscientious, and yet 
lack precision around the edges. As such, a conscience claim should not be regarded as 
lacking in maturity or credibility simply because the individual who makes it acknowledges 
areas of doubt. Indeed, a cautious approach which acknowledges that we are not always 
certain of our moral responsibilities in hard cases might be regarded as evidence of maturity. 
The sincerity criterion (1) is also relevant here. It would be regrettable if individuals making 
claims of conscience were incentivised to downplay any doubt in order to pass a certainty 
test, rather than being encouraged to articulate their positions sincerely within a mutually-
respectful exchange. 
 Meyers and Woods suggest that where a HCP has been granted a CBE from 
participation in a practice, she has a duty to compensate for her exemption by undertaking 
some other alternative µpublic-benefiting¶ service (duty (viii)).125  We are unpersuaded by this 
for two reasons. First, it has unpleasant punitive overtones.  The phrase µpublic service¶ is 
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redolent of reparation or sentencing, and, as such, carries the implication that the HCP who 
exercises a CBE is guilty of a failing or offence, as opposed to being a reflective moral agent 
striving to preserve her integrity. Second, in practice employees who cannot or will not 
perform one task will inevitably be redeployed to other tasks in line with their skills, 
seniority, and (if applicable) their contract. Such redeployment is normal activity and not an 
µalternative public-benefitting professional service¶. It is difficult to imagine how any of a 
HCP¶VGXWLHV in a national health service could avoid being µpublic-benefitting¶. How would 
ZH GLVWLQJXLVK DQ HPSOR\HH¶V RUGLQDU\ HYHU\GD\ SXEOLF-benefitting activities from her 
³alternative´ activities? If an employee was redeployed in a way not befitting her skills in 
order to underline the fact that she was now engaging in her ³compensatory´ activities, this 
would be a misuse of resources and compound the sense that a punishment was being meted 
out. This, in turn, would issue a powerful negative message about how conscience is regarded 
in the healthcare context.    
 Duties (ix), to refer, and (x), to inform patients of their treatment options, both 
encounter the serious obstacle of complicity in wrongdoing. It has been claimed that µWKH
VWDWXVTXRRQFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQLQPHGLFLQH¶is that HCPs can exercise CBEs provided 
they make a referral to another HCP.126 We have noted that in England and Scotland at least, 
a duty of µSURPSW UHIHUUDO¶ LV LPSosed by secondary legislation on those who contract with 
the NHS. In her judgment in Doogan, Lady Hale reasserted the duty to refer in her obiter 
remark that: 
 
it is a feature of conscience clauses generally within the health care profession that the 
conscientious objector be under an obligation to refer the case to a professional who 
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does not share that objection.  7KLVLVDQHFHVVDU\FRUROODU\RIWKHSURIHVVLRQDO¶VGXW\
of care towards the patient.127 
 
While it seems clear that a duty to refer does attach to the CBE in section 4, the suggestion 
WKDW VXFK D GXW\ µLV D IHDWXUH RI FRQVFLHQFH FODXVHV JHQHUDOO\¶ RU, indeed, µLV D QHFHVVDU\
FRUROODU\RI WKHSURIHVVLRQDO¶VGXW\RIFDUH¶LVTXHVWLRQDEOH As Davis notes, a duty to refer 
µappears to be inconsistent with the [perceived] duty not to perIRUPWKHSURFHGXUH¶128 because 
µby referrinJRQHHQGRUVHVWKHUHOHYDQWDFW¶.129  This problem is widely acknowledged,130 and 
is summed up by Del Bò¶V REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW µ[t]here is something morally unsound about 
VWDWLQJ³I do not kill people myself, but let me tell you about a guy who does´¶.131 Cavanaugh 
argues that a HCP exercising a CBE has a duty to inform her patients that they may seek the 
contested treatment elsewhere, and so: 
 
[o]ne must bring to the patienW¶s attention that not all medical professionals agree with 
RQH¶s own view « The patient ought to emerge having a sense both of one's grounds 
for objecting and of the pluralism found in medicine regarding the controverted 
matter.132 
 
Two kinds of reassurance have been offered regarding complicity in this context. 
Antommaria claims WKDW LQIRUPLQJ D SDWLHQW DERXW RSWLRQV FDQQRW DPRXQW WR µLOOLFLW FR-
RSHUDWLRQ¶ EHFDXVH FR-operation requires something with which to co-RSHUDWH DQG µthe 
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patient has not formed an intention until the informed consent process is complete¶133 But 
looking backwards from the outcome of a process, would we not wish to say that the person 
who had put the eventual outcome on the table as an option in the first place had ³facilitated´ 
the process, and so been complicit in it? Alternatively, %URFN UHDVRQV WKDW µif the physician 
who does the informing also recommends against it, makes clear why she believes it to be 
LPPRUDO DQG GRHVQ¶W KHOS WKH SDWLHQW WR REWDLQ LW WKHQ KHU FRPSOLFLW\ VHHPV UHlatively 
PLQLPDO¶134 This attempt to minimise the role of the informer is problematic. We could deny 
WKDW WKH SK\VLFLDQ¶V UROH LV PLQLPDO DV LW LV D sine qua non in the chain of events which 
culminates in the immoral action, regardless of whether she counsels against the immoral 
choice. Or we could accept that the degree of complicity is minimal but argue that a small 
degree of complicity in a seriously immoral enterprise is in itself serious. Imagine that X had 
a small but vital role in a campaign of genocide; a role without which the genocide would 
likely not have occurred at all. Does the fact that ;¶Vrole was small mean her culpability is 
also small, notwithstanding that the wrong was serious and her role vital?  Or imagine that 
infanticide is decriminalised and Y, who objects to it on moral grounds, informs a patient of 
its availability. Does Y have any moral culpability in the subsequent death of the infant? If 
she does, so must a HCP who informs a patient about abortion.  In the context of abortion, the 
view that ³merely informing´ does not amount to serious complicity is predicated on an 
underlying assumption that abortion itself is not seriously wrong, which is precisely what the 
exempting HCP disputes.   
 Recall that according to the integrity criterion, (criterion (4)), a CBE arises only 
where performance would risk damage to the personal integrity of a HCP; only, in other 
words, ZKHUHD+&3GHHPVDSUDFWLFHWREHµLQWULQVLFDOO\DQGVHULRXVO\ZURQJ¶.135 To force a 
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HCP into complicity with such a practiFH WR D GHJUHH ZKLFK LV µDW OHDVW VLJQLILFDQW LI QRW
VXEVWDQWLDO¶,136 must itself be a violation of integrity.137 Accordingly, we reject the notion that 
any duty to inform or refer ought to attach to the exercise of a CBE, since in our view, it is 
logically nRQVHQVLFDO WR µSURWHFW¶+&3V LQWHJULW\ LQDZD\ WKDWobliges them to violate their 
integrity through complicity. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In line with the mainstream view, we regard conscience a matter of personal integrity, and we 
consider legal protection for conscience as essential in order to prevent HCPs suffering 
serious violations of integrity in the course of their employment. CBEs must operate within 
certain limits, however, and much academic discussion on conscience to date has centred on 
what these proper limits are. McHale is correct in observing that the guidance currently 
offered by professional bodies can be problematic; it is often unclear and/or contradictory, 
and in some cases, it appears to support CBEs in contexts where the law currently recognises 
no such right.   
 Here, we have proposed three factors which ought to be recognised as placing natural 
limits on the operation of CBEs: (A) they apply only where the status of a practice as proper 
medical treatment is liminal; (B) a position is authentically conscientious only if it fulfils four 
criteria (sincerity, articulation, tolerance, and integrity); and (C) wherever a CBE ought to be 
acknowledged because (A) and (B) are satisfied, it operates with certain duties attached.  
Duties to behave respectfully, avoid unnecessary burdens on patients and colleagues, and 
treat in emergencies all attach to the exercise of a CBE because they are entailed by 
conscientiousness in the same way as the four criteria. Other duties are recognised in 
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qualified form: a duty WR GLVFORVH RQH¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ DGYDQFH provided this does not place 
HCPs at undue risk; a duty to DUWLFXODWH RQH¶V SRVLWLRQ provided the articulation process 
emphasises reflection and respectful exchange rather than putting HCPV¶GHHSO\-held views 
³RQWULDO´; and a duty to provide ³other care´ so long as this does not amount to complicity in 
the contested practice. We reject other duties proposed in the literature, however: duties to 
inform and refer entail a logically indefensible complicity with the objected practice; a duty 
to perform alternative public-benefitting service reflects a punitive attitude to CBEs and is 
practically unnecessary; and a GXW\WRXQGHUVWDQGRQH¶VSRVLWLRQDPRXQWVeither to a duty to 
be sure, which is unreasonable, or to a duty WR UHIOHFW RQH[SODLQ RQH¶V SRVLWLRQ, which is 
already covered under the duty to articulate (duty (v)). 
 These three limits represent natural and defensible parameters for the operation of 
CBEs. Were they to be applied in practice, those who have concerns about the creeping 
expansion of CBEs could be reassured that the development of the law in this area would 
have to take place within natural limits: criteria for genuine conscientiousness would be 
applied before a CBE could be exercised, and the exercise of a CBE would be a dutiful, 
respectful undertaking, a different engagement with the patient rather than a disengagement.  
At the same time, proponents of conscience rights could be reassured that the crucial link 
between conscience and integrity was being acknowledged, that their exemption from certain 
activities would be free of complicity, and that rights of conscience would be available to 
HCPs (with accompanying duties) wherever a practice had liminal status and the criteria were 
met. Although our proposed framework is in no sense a compromise, therefore, it offers 
reassurance both to those who defend conscience rights and to those who resist them. 
